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Abstract 
This paper studies equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed market with a public firm 
and a private firm. The public firm is concerned with social welfare, while the private firm 
aims to maximize its own profit. Each firm decides whether to adopt an integrated or a 
decentralized channel. We examine two standard market competition modes, Bertrand and 
Cournot. Within each competition mode, we consider two typical vertical contracts, 
wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts. Our results suggest that equilibrium channel 
structures depend on the market competition mode, the vertical contract form, and the 
level of product substitutability. Specifically, the channel strategy of the private firm 
depends mainly on the vertical contract form: under a two-part tariff contract, the private 
firm always chooses decentralization; under a wholesale-price contract, the private firm 
chooses integration for most scenarios except for highly substitutable products under 
Bertrand competition (i.e., under very intense competition). The channel strategy of the 
public firm depends mainly on the competition mode: under Bertrand competition, the 
public firm always chooses decentralization; under Cournot competition, the public firm 
always chooses the opposite of the private firm’s strategy. 
 
Keywords: Channel strategy; Mixed market; Bertrand competition; Cournot competition; 
Vertical contract. 
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Highlights: 
1. We study channel strategies with a public firm competing with a private firm. 
2. Two standard market competition modes, Bertrand and Cournot, are considered.  
3. We consider both wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts.  
4. Channel strategies of the private firm rely mainly on the vertical contract form. 
5. Channel strategies of the public firm depend mainly on the competition mode. 
Highlights (for review)
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Distribution channel strategies in a mixed market 
 
Abstract This paper studies equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed market with a public firm 
and a private firm. The public firm is concerned with social welfare, while the private firm aims 
to maximize its own profit. Each firm decides whether to adopt an integrated or a decentralized 
channel. We examine two standard market competition modes, Bertrand and Cournot. Within 
each competition mode, we consider two typical vertical contracts, wholesale-price and two-part 
tariff contracts. Our results suggest that equilibrium channel structures depend on the market 
competition mode, the vertical contract form, and the level of product substitutability. 
Specifically, the channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract 
form: under a two-part tariff contract, the private firm always chooses decentralization; under a 
wholesale-price contract, the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for 
highly substitutable products under Bertrand competition (i.e., under very intense competition). 
The channel strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode: under Bertrand 
competition, the public firm always chooses decentralization; under Cournot competition, the 
public firm always chooses the opposite of the private firm’s strategy. 
 
Keywords: Channel strategy; Mixed market; Bertrand competition; Cournot competition; 
Vertical contract. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mixed markets with private firms competing against public firms are common in various 
industries such as healthcare, transportation, steel, electricity and telecommunications (Epstein, 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
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2009; Ghosh and Mitra, 2010; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012; Scrimitore, 
2013). For instance, a Canadian crown corporation, VIA Rail, competes against other privately 
owned passenger railways such as Rocky Mountaineer and bus companies such as Greyhound 
Lines. Another crown corporation, Canada Post, competes against many other private logistics 
firms such as UPS. In China, the government-owned FAW Group Corporation competes against 
private firms such as Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd. Many Chinese public hospitals compete 
against private hospitals in the healthcare market. In the US, the government-sponsored firm, 
Federal Home Loan Banks, competes against other private banks. In general, public firms owned 
by the government seek to maximize social welfare, while private firms are typically profit-
driven. This is common in many studies in the mixed oligopoly literature (De Fraja and Delbono, 
1990; Anderson et al., 1997; Ghosh and Mitra, 2010; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012; Scrimitore, 
2013, 2014). 
Besides horizontal competition, public firms often operate in vertical mixed markets in many 
countries (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996; Bose and Gupta, 2013). Various distribution patterns 
exist in vertical mixed markets with competing public and private firms. For example, some 
public healthcare services in the UK are outsourced by the government to private firms such as 
Sunderland Home Care Associates, which competes against many other integrated private 
healthcare firms (in this example the public firm chooses to decentralize while the private firms 
choose to integrate). The federally-owned integrated Canada Post Corporation (also, the US 
Postal Service) competes against the private logistics firm UPS, which franchises its service to 
independently-owned stores (in this example the public firm chooses to integrate while the 
private firm chooses to decentralize). In China, both the government-owned FAW Group 
Corporation and the private GEELY Automobile Holdings Ltd sell their vehicles through 
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independent private dealers (in this example the public and the private firms both choose to 
decentralize). Motivated by these different distribution channel structures in mixed markets with 
competing public and private firms, this paper attempts to explain when and why these 
distribution patterns occur in a mixed market. Specifically, our research questions are: 
i). Under what circumstances should a public (private) firm employ an integrated or a 
decentralized channel? 
ii). What are the inherent forces driving various equilibrium channel strategies in a mixed 
market? 
We examine two standard competition modes in the product market, Bertrand and Cournot 
competition, both common in practice. In general, Bertrand competition applies if capacity and 
output can be easily adjusted, and Cournot competition applies otherwise. de Jong et al. (2008) 
showed that both competition modes are common in practice and the application of each 
competition mode depends on the characteristics of industries. Bertrand competition is more 
suitable in industries such as steel pipe and tubes, wine and brandy, telegraph apparatus and 
petroleum refining, while firms engage in Cournot competition in industries like railroad 
equipment, electro-medical apparatus, steel works and blast furnaces. As will be seen in this 
paper, the competition mode (Bertrand or Cournot) critically determines the public firm’s channel 
strategy. 
Within each competition mode, we consider two standard vertical contracts, wholesale-price 
and two-part tariff contracts, both common in practice (Cachon, 2003; Anand et al., 2008). 
Wholesale-price contracts are popular mainly due to simplicity, but result in low efficiency in 
supply chains. While two-part tariff contracts can increase channel efficiency, it needs further 
information about downstream decisions (Cachon, 2003). Wholesale-price contracts apply to 
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supply chains where firms lack the information to coordinate, while two-part tariff contracts 
apply to supply chains when sufficient information can be accessed. As pointed out by Anand et 
al. (2008), two-part tariff contracts can also serve as a form of quantity discount contracts in the 
operations and marketing literatures. In this paper, as we study the channel strategies of firms, we 
take the two-part tariff contract as a representative form of nonlinear (non-wholesale-price) 
contracts, which represents the case that information sharing and channel coordination exists 
between channel partners and thereby “double marginalization” is no longer the main concern of 
a firm when it decides to decentralize.  
The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the public and the private firms simultaneously 
decide whether to adopt an integrated channel or to decentralize by distributing products through 
an exclusive private retailer. In the second stage, for any firm who decentralizes, the wholesale 
price is set. In the third stage, product market competition (Bertrand or Cournot) occurs. This 
sequence has been widely adopted in the literature (McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Lee and Staelin, 
1997; Bhardwaj and Balasubramanian, 2005; Piccolo and Reisinger, 2011). 
Studying channel strategies in a mixed market yields the following new insights. First, the 
channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract form: under a two-
part tariff contract, the private firm always chooses decentralization; under a wholesale-price 
contract, the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for highly substitutable 
products under Bertrand competition (i.e., under very intense competition). Second, the channel 
strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode. Specifically, under Bertrand 
competition, the public firm always chooses decentralization because it can fully adjust the 
downstream competition to maximize social welfare through subsidy. Under Cournot competition, 
because changing its wholesale price has conflicting impacts on the two firms’ downstream 
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quantities, the public firm can no longer fully adjust the downstream competition by 
decentralization, and thus it does not always choose decentralization but always chooses the 
opposite of the private firm’s strategy. 
To compare our theoretical results with the real-world examples mentioned earlier, we 
summarize our results of equilibrium channel structures in Table 1 and the real-world examples 
in Table 2. From Table 1, under wholesale price contract, Bertrand and Cournot competition give 
the same equilibrium channel structure that the public firm chooses decentralization while the 
private firm chooses integration (except for highly substitutable products under Bertrand 
competition). Thus, in Table 2 we give one common example of healthcare mixed market for 
both Bertrand and Cournot competition under wholesale price contract, noting that both 
competition modes apply to and appear in healthcare market. For each real-world example in 
Table 2, we give references/evidences showing why the example could fit a particular 
combination of competition mode and contract structure. Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, we can 
see that our theoretical results fit these real-world examples, which implies that our theoretical 
results could be viewed as one possible explanation of these different channel structures in real-
world mixed markets.  
 
Table 1. Summary of theoretical results of equilibrium channel structures 
Contract 
Structure 
Competition Mode 
Bertrand Cournot 
 
Wholesale 
price contract 
Public Firm: decentralization 
Private Firm: integration (except for 
highly substitutable products) 
Public Firm: decentralization 
Private Firm: integration 
Two-part tariff 
contract 
Public Firm: decentralization 
Private Firm: decentralization 
Public Firm: integration 
Private Firm: decentralization 
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Table 2. Summary of real-world examples 
Contract 
Structure 
Competition Mode 
Brtrand Cournot 
 
Wholesale 
price contract 
 Healthcare firms often engage in either Bertrand (Capps et al., 2010; 
Gowrisankaran et al., 2013) or Cournot competition (Deo and Corbett, 
2009). 
 Some public healthcare services in the UK are outsourced by the 
government to private firms such as Sunderland Home Care Associates, 
which competes against many other integrated private healthcare firms (in 
this example the public firm chooses to decentralize while the private firms 
choose to integrate). 
 The UK healthcare sectors are funded mainly based on performance metrics 
such as the number of patients treated and length of workload, which 
resembles the wholesale price contract (British Medical Association, 2014) 
Two-part tariff 
contract 
 Auto firms often engage in 
Bertrand competition (Tremblay 
et al., 2013). 
 In China, both the government-
owned FAW Group Corporation 
and the private BYD Company 
Limited sell their vehicles to 
independent private dealers 
through franchising (in this 
example the public and the private 
firms both choose to decentralize) 
 Franchise distribution is common 
in the automotive industry, which 
is a typical two-part tariff contract 
(Lafontaine and Morton, 2010). 
 Cournot competition fits well in the 
network of postal delivery (Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 2009). 
 The federally-owned integrated 
Canada Post Corporation (also, the 
US Postal Service) competes 
against the private logistics firm 
UPS, which franchises its service to 
independently-owned stores (in this 
example the public firm chooses to 
integrate while the private firm 
chooses to decentralize),  
 UPS distributes its business through 
franchising, which is a typical two-
part tariff contract (The UPS Store, 
2014). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. In 
Section 3, we examine the channel strategies of a mixed duopoly under Bertrand competition. 
The channel strategies under Cournot competition are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
Two streams of literature are related to our research, the mixed market literature and the 
channel strategy literature. In the following, we shall review each stream separately. 
A vast body of research has been conducted on mixed markets (see, e.g., Fraja and 
Delbono,1990). Recent mixed market literature mostly focuses on the following topics: effect of 
subsidy and privatization (White, 1996; Fjell and Heywood, 2004; Kato and Tomaru, 2007; 
Tomaru and Saito, 2010; Matsumura and Tomaru, 2013; Scrimitore, 2013, 2014), choice of 
competition modes (Ghosh and Mitra, 2010; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012; Scrimitore, 2013, 
2014), price and non-price competition (Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006; Ishibashi and Kaneko, 
2008; Zikos, 2010; Matsumura and Sunada, 2013; Lutz and Pezzino, 2014), and effect of entry 
(Matsumura and Kanda, 2005; Heywood and Ye, 2009; Wang and Chen, 2010; Li and Zhang, 
2011; Bennett and La Manna, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). None of these works studied distribution 
channel strategies. Besides, all the aforementioned researches were conducted with horizontal 
competition, while we focus on channel strategies where both horizontal and vertical 
competitions exist, which has not been studied before in the mixed market literature. 
A few papers looked into vertical mixed markets. Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) examined 
which level should be privatized in a three-tier vertical market with an upstream firm, a 
downstream firm and a retailer. Similarly, Bose and Gupta (2013) discussed welfare implications 
of privatization in a bilateral monopoly. Departing from these studies, which focused on the 
effects of privatization in a single supply chain, we study the channel strategies of two competing 
supply chains in a mixed market. Overall, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing 
literature on mixed markets looked into, in the presence of a private competitor in the market, 
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8 
whether public goods or services should be distributed through a private partner or directly by a 
public firm, which is the focus of this paper. 
Before reviewing the vast literature on distribution channel strategies, we would like to first 
highlight in general how this paper makes a contribution by extending this branch of study to a 
mixed market. To the best of our knowledge, almost all the existing studies on channel strategies 
focused on competitions between private for-profit firms (one exception being Zhao et al. (2010), 
which will be discussed in detail later). Introducing a public welfare-oriented firm, this paper 
establishes new results in equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, we show that various 
channel structures with the public or private firm choosing integration or decentralization can 
occur in equilibrium, but the classic equilibrium that both firms choose integration is never an 
equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. The reason is that the public firm behaves fundamentally 
different from private firms. In particular, as mentioned earlier, we find that the competition 
mode (Bertrand or Cournot) critically determines the public firm’s choice of channel strategy, 
which is never reported in the literature on private firms. 
Initially, the literature on channel structure revealed that intermediaries can act as competition 
buffers, i.e., decentralization can mitigate competition (McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Moorthy, 
1988; Trivedi, 1998). One key point from these studies is that, when choosing channel strategies, 
manufacturers should trade off between the benefit from competition buffering and the loss from 
double marginalization. The equilibrium channel strategies in these papers are as follows. First, 
the channel structure where both firms integrate is always one equilibrium channel structure. 
Second, the decentralized channel structure where both firms decentralize occurs as another 
equilibrium for highly substitutable products. Unlike these studies, we study channel strategies in 
a different market structure, i.e., a mixed market, and find that various channel structures can 
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9 
occur in equilibrium. In particular, a big difference of this paper’s results is that both firms 
integrating is never an equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. 
Many researchers extended the above mentioned studies by adding other dimensions such as 
managerial incentives (Bhardwaj and Balasubramanian, 2005), non-price competition (Zhao et al., 
2009, Liu and Tyagi, 2011; Wang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012; Zhou and Cao, 2014), risk 
aversion (Xiao and Choi, 2009), number of players (Anderson and Bao, 2010), demand 
uncertainty (Cao et al., 2010). Considering managerial incentives, Bhardwaj and 
Balasubramanian (2005) demonstrated that an asymmetric channel structure with one integrated 
manufacturer and the other decentralized manufacturer arises in equilibrium. Zhao et al. (2009) 
discussed manufacturers' channel strategies with both price competition and quality competition 
and found that both manufacturers always integrate in equilibrium. Liu and Tyagi (2011) showed 
that both retailers always decentralize in equilibrium with both price and location competition. 
Unlike the studies above, we examine channel strategies in a mixed market and show that various 
channel structures can occur in equilibrium. Xiao and Choi (2009) and Zhou and Cao (2014) 
examined endogenous channel structures with risk aversion and displayed quantity competition, 
respectively, and they found various channel structures can arise in equilibrium. We depart from 
their studies by considering endogenous channel strategies in a mixed duopoly, while they 
consider channel strategies of private firms. Comparisons between integrated and decentralized 
channels were conducted by Anderson and Bao (2010), Wang et al. (2011) and Zhang et al. 
(2012), with focuses on the effect of number of players, persuasive advertising and informative 
advertising, respectively, but they did not study endogenous channel strategies. 
A few papers studied channel strategies from different aspects. Considering durable goods in 
a multi-period single-channel setting, Desai et al. (2004) and Arya and Mittendorf (2006) found 
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10 
that manufacturers could benefit from channel decentralization even without outside competitors. 
With tacit collusion, Piccolo and Reisinger (2011) concluded that various channel structures can 
arise in equilibrium. They examined the competitive channel strategies of two private firms, 
while we discuss channel strategies of two firms with different ownerships, i.e., a public firm 
competing against a private firm. 
There are also studies on dual-channel supply chain design. Balasubramanian (1998), Chiang 
et al. (2003) and Cattani et al. (2006) discussed the strategic interaction between a manufacturer-
owned direct channel and an independent retail channel. Ordover and Shaffer (2007) and Xu et al. 
(2010) examined the incentive of a component manufacturer to supply core components to an 
independent original equipment manufacturer. Khouja et al. (2010) analyzed channel and price 
strategies of a manufacturer with retail-captive consumers. Considering both price and delivery 
lead time decisions, Xu et al. (2012) extended the work of Chiang et al. (2003) by analyzing how 
these decisions jointly affect the manufacturer's dual-channel design. With complements, Xia et 
al. (2013) and Pun (2013) investigated channel strategies for two competing firms and a 
monopolist firm. Our research differs from the aforementioned works in that we concentrate on 
competitive channel strategies in a mixed duopoly, i.e., a public firm and a private firm compete 
against each other in selecting channel strategies. 
The work most closely related to our research is Zhao et al. (2010), which examined channel 
strategies for a non-profit firm competing against a for-profit firm. The key differences are as 
follows. First, they assumed the non-profit firm has an objective of maximizing demand, while 
the public firm in this paper pursues to maximize social welfare. Second, they did not consider 
endogenous channel strategy of the private firm. Third, they only considered Bertrand 
competition, while we examine both Bertrand and Cournot competition and it turns out that the 
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competition mode critically determines the public firm’s choice. Fourth, within each competition 
mode, we discuss two types of vertical contracts, wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts, 
while they considered wholesale-price contract only. 
 
3. Channel strategies under Bertrand competition 
Consider a mixed market with one public firm (firm 0) and one private firm (firm 1), 
manufacturing product 0 and product 1, respectively. As in Scrimitore (2013) and other research, 
we assume that the public firm maximizes social welfare while the private firm pursues profit 
maximization. Following Singh and Vives (1984), we express the standard consumer surplus as 
    
gross utility
expenditure
2 21 ( ) ,  , 0,1;
2
i j i j i j i i j jCS q q q q q q p q p q i j i j 
 
         
 
  (1) 
where CS  stands for the consumer surplus, and ip  and  0,1iq i   denote product i's retail price 
and quantity, respectively. The first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (1) denotes the utility 
function of the representative consumer, which is assumed quadratic and strictly concave. This 
form of utility function gives rise to linear demand structure as shown by Eq. (2) when the 
representative consumer maximizes her consumer surplus (Singh and Vives, 1984).  
From Eq. (1), we derive the inverse demand as 
  , ,  , 0,1;i i j i jp q q q q i j i j        (2) 
where   is the price cap and  0,1   measures the degree of product substitutability, with 
0   and 1 representing the cases of completely independent and homogenous products, 
respectively. 
Inverting Eq. (2), we obtain the direct demand as 
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  
 
2
1
, ,  , 0,1;
1
i j
i i j
p p
q p p i j i j
  

  
  

  (3) 
In this section, we adopt Eq. (3) to examine Bertrand competition, and Cournot competition 
will be analyzed in Section 3 by using Eq. (2). To focus on the strategic effect, we assume that 
both firms' marginal costs are normalized to zero. Social welfare equals to the sum of consumer 
surplus and both channels' profits. Hereafter, social welfare and the private firm's profit are 
respectively denoted by SW  and 1F , where the subscript 'F1' indexes the private firm. 
Throughout the paper, we use the superscript 'MN' to indicate various channel structures, 
where 
The first element M = I or D indicates the public firm's integration or distributing through a 
private retailer (retailer 0), respectively. 
The second element N = I or D denotes the private firm's integration or distributing through a 
private retailer (retailer 1), respectively. 
 
3.1. Channel structure II 
Consider the first scenario in which both the public firm (firm 0) and the private firm (firm 1) 
choose to integrate. Then firm 0’s social welfare maximization problem and firm 1's profit 
maximization problem are 
 
     
   
0
1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1
, , ,
, ,
II
p
II
F
p
Max SW p p p q p p p q p p CS
Max p p p q p p
   


 

.  (4) 
Substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (4) and solving the first-order conditions (FOCs) yield  
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 
 
0
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
II
II
p
p
  

 







 
 
,  
where the asterisk '*' indicates the optimal status. Simple comparison yields 
 
0 1
0 1II IIp p     , which means that the public firm sets a lower price than the private firm 
due to the social welfare concern. Based on the retail prices, we obtain the social welfare and the 
private firm's profit, which are summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
 
3.2. Channel structure ID 
In this subsection we consider that the public firm (firm 0) integrates while the private firm 
(firm 1) decentralizes by distributing through a private retailer (retailer 1). By backward 
induction, we first analyze the last stage. Knowing firm 1's wholesale price 1w , firm 0 and 
retailer 1 solve 
 
     
     
0
1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
, , ,
, ,
ID
p
ID
R
p
Max SW p p p q p p p q p p CS
Max p p p w q p p
   


  

,  (5) 
where the subscript 'R1' denotes retailer 1. 
Solving the FOCs from Eq. (5), we obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0 1 2
1
1 1 2
1
2
1
2
ID
ID
w
p w
w
p w
  

 



    


 
 
.  (6) 
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For firm 1's wholesale price decision, we consider two vertical contracts, wholesale-price and 
two-part tariff contracts. Following Piccolo and Reisinger (2011), we examine the two vertical 
contracts as follows: 
i). With a wholesale-price contract, firm 1's objective is 
      
1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1, ,
W ID
F
w
Max p p w q p p  ,  (7) 
where the bracketed 'W' in the superscript indicates the wholesale-price contract case. 
ii). If firm 1 adopts a two-part tariff contract, it can extract all the profit from retailer 1. Thus, 
firm 1's objective with a two-part tariff contract is 
            
1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1, , , ,
T ID
F
w
Max p p p w q p p w q p p p q p p     ,  (8) 
where the bracketed 'T' in the superscript indicates the two-part tariff contract case. 
  Substituting Eq. (6) into Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively, we solve the two contract scenarios 
and obtain the optimal wholesale prices as  
 
 
 1 2 1
W ID
w





  
and  
  
 
2
1
2 1
T ID
w
 




  
for the wholesale-price and two-part tariff contracts, respectively. Note that 
 
1
T ID
w

 is lower than 
 
1
W ID
w

 because the two-part tariff contract can coordinate firm 1 and retailer 1's pricing 
decisions. Based on the wholesale price decisions, the social welfare and firm 1's profit under 
both vertical contracts can be obtained and are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix.  
Comparing channel structure II with channel structure ID, we have 
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Lemma 1. Under Bertrand competition, when the public firm integrates, the private firm's 
channel strategies are as follows. 
(i). With a wholesale-price contract, the private firm prefers decentralization to integration if 
0.816  , and prefers integration to decentralization otherwise. 
(ii). With a two-part tariff contract, the private firm always prefers decentralization to integration. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The intuitions underlying Lemma 1 are as follows. With a wholesale-price contract, if the 
private firm decentralizes, the introduction of an independent retailer will cause the well-known 
“double marginalization” problem, which tends to reduce the private firm’s profit. On the other 
hand, under decentralization the independent retailer serves as a buffer that alleviates 
competition between channels and tends to increase the private firm’s profit, which is the so-
called “retailer buffer” effect (McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Wang et al., 2011). In general, 
between these two conflicting effects of decentralization, the “retailer buffer” effect may 
outweigh the “double marginalization” effect when products are highly substitutable, i.e., when 
the competition is intense. Part (i) of Lemma 1 is in line with this classic result: the private firm 
prefers decentralization when products are highly substitutable ( 0.816  ) and prefers 
integration otherwise. 
With the above interpretations, part (ii) of Lemma 1 follows easily: with a two-part tariff 
contract, decentralization stills gives the “retailer buffer” effect, while no longer has the “double 
marginalization” problem as the private firm can always extract all the profit of its downstream 
retailer, and thus the private firm always prefer decentralization. 
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While it is convenient and consistent with the literature to use the two classic terms of 
“double marginalization” and “retailer buffer” to explain the behavior of the private firm, these 
two terms do not directly apply to the public firm. The reason is simple: the “double 
marginalization” effect and the “retailer buffer” effect are both about profit, while the public firm 
is not profit-oriented. Because of this, we shall revisit these two classic terms from a basic 
optimization or game theoretic perspective, which will help explain the behavior of the public 
firm in later analysis. 
From an optimization perspective, the “double marginalization” effect of decentralization is 
simply about the “price-setting power”. That is, if the private firm integrates, it can directly set 
the retail price for profit maximization, while under decentralization, the independent retailer 
will set the retail price for its own profit maximization. Thus, decentralization will compromise 
the price-setting power of the private firm and thereby tend to reduce its profit. 
The “retailer buffer” effect of decentralization could be viewed as a “first-mover advantage” 
from a game theoretic perspective. That is, when the private firm distributes through an 
independent retailer, the public firm (which does not decentralize) has to directly compete 
against the retailer in the market, and the market competition result depends on the private firm’s 
wholesale price as given by Eq. (6). In other words, by decentralization the private firm becomes 
a leader or first-mover in the game, which can set its wholesale price to control the downstream 
market competition. 
The above interpretations using “price-setting power” and “first-mover advantage” are based 
on basic optimization and game theoretic analyses, and thus apply to both the private and the 
public firms. Hereafter, when we explain the private firm’s choice between integration and 
decentralization, to be consistent with the literature, we shall use the two classic terms of “double 
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marginalization” and “retailer buffer”. When we explain the public firm’s choice, we shall refer 
to the “price-setting power” (or “quantity-setting power” under Cournot competition) and the 
“first-mover advantage”. 
 
3.3. Channel structure DI 
Here we consider another channel structure where the public firm (firm 0) distributes its 
product through a private retailer (retailer 0) while the private firm (firm 1) integrates. Given 
firm 0's wholesale price, retailer 0 and firm 1 solve 
 
     
   
0
1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1
, ,
, ,
DI
R
p
DI
F
p
Max p p p w q p p
Max p p p q p p
   


 

,  (9) 
where 0w  is firm 0's wholesale price, and the subscript 'R0' denotes retailer 0. 
Solving the FOCs from Eq. (9), we have 
 
 
 
 
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2
0
0 0 2
2
0
1 0 2
2 2
4
2
4
DI
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w
p w
w
p w
  

   



   
 


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

.  (10) 
Since firm 0 always maximizes social welfare, a wholesale-price contract and a two-part 
tariff contract between firm 0 and retailer 0 make no difference. Anticipating Eq. (10), firm 0 
maximizes social welfare by choosing the optimal wholesale price as 
 
   
2 2
0 2
1 2
4 3
DIw
  

   

.  
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Note here firm 0, for the welfare-enhancing purpose, subsidizes retailer 0 ( 0 0
DIw   ) to 
induce a lower retail price. Substituting 0
DIw   into Eq. (10) and then Eq. (9), we can derive the 
social welfare and firm 1's profit, which are summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix.  
Comparing channel structure II with channel structure DI, we have 
 
Lemma 2. Under Bertrand competition, when the private firm integrates, the public firm always 
prefers decentralization to integration, regardless of the vertical contract form. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The underlying intuitions of Lemma 2 are as follows. Given the private firm's choice of 
integration, if the public firm integrates, it can directly set its retail price to ensure welfare 
maximization, i.e., it has direct “price-setting power”. On the other hand, if the public firm 
decentralizes, it can enjoy the “first-mover advantage” (i.e., setting 0w  before product market 
competition) without losing its “price-setting power” as it can always use its wholesale price to 
adjust downstream competition. Specifically, Eq. (10) shows that the “first-mover advantage” 
under decentralization does not contradict the “price-setting power” of firm 0: reducing 0w  will 
reduce 0p  (price-setting power that lowers the retail price of its own channel for welfare 
enhancement) and will also reduce 1p  (first-mover advantage that lowers its competitor’s retail 
price for welfare enhancement). Simply speaking, when the private firm integrates, the public 
firm always prefers decentralization because decentralization offers first-mover advantage 
without compromising its price-setting power. 
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3.4. Channel structure DD 
Now we move on to consider a fully decentralized channel structure, where both the public 
and the private firm distribute their products exclusively through independent private retailers, 
retailer 0 and retailer 1, respectively. Knowing upstream wholesale prices 0w  and 1w , retailer 0 
and retailer 1 maximize their profits given by 
 
     
     
0
1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
, ,
, ,
DD
R
p
DD
R
p
Max p p p w q p p
Max p p p w q p p
   


  

.  (11) 
Solving the FOCs from Eq. (11) yields 
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 
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1 0
1 0 1 2
2 2
,
4
2 2
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4
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w w
p w w
w w
p w w
   

   



    
 


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

.  (12) 
Recall that the two vertical contracts make no difference to firm 0's decision rule, while firm 1 
has different objectives under different contracts. Therefore, observing Eq. (12), firm 0 and firm 
1 optimize their objectives 
 
     
   
0
1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1
, ,
,
W DD
w
W DD
F
w
Max SW p q p p p q p p CS
Max w q p p
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

 

  (13) 
under the wholesale-price contract scenario, and solve  
 
     
   
0
1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1
, ,
,
T DD
w
T DD
F
w
Max SW p q p p p q p p CS
Max p q p p
   


 

  (14) 
under the two-part tariff contract scenario. 
Substituting Eq. (12) into Eqs. (13) and (14), we can solve the equilibrium wholesale prices 
under the two contract scenarios, and then obtain the respective equilibrium social welfare and 
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firm 1’s profit under the two contract scenarios, which are all summarized in Table 3 in the 
Appendix . 
Comparing channel structure ID with channel structure DD, we have 
 
Lemma 3. Under Bertrand competition, if the private firm decentralizes, the public firm always 
prefers decentralization to integration, regardless of the vertical contract form. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is similar to that of Lemma 2. Given that the private firm 
decentralizes, if the public firm integrates, it has direct “price-setting power” of its own channel 
but this “price-setting power” is dominated by the private firm's overall “first-mover advantage” 
as shown by Eq. (6) ( 1w  determines both 0
IDp   and 1
IDp  ). On the other hand, from Eq. (12), if the 
public firm decentralizes, it can not only influence the downstream retail prices, but also 
counteract the private firm's profit-oriented behaviour prior to market competition ( 0
DDp   and 
1
DDp  depend on both 0w  and 1w , not 1w  alone). More specifically, from Eq. (12), the public firm 
can reduce its wholesale price 0w  to lower 0
DDp   (price-setting power that lowers the retail price 
of its own channel for welfare enhancement) and also lower 1
DDp   (counteracting its competitor’s 
first-mover advantage to lower its competitor’s retail price for welfare enhancement). Simply 
speaking, when the private firm decentralizes, the public firm always prefers decentralization 
because decentralization counteracts the private firm’s first-mover advantage and retains the 
public firm’s price-setting power. 
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Based on Lemma 2 and 3, we see that, under Bertrand competition, the public firm always 
prefers decentralization to integration, regardless of the private firm's channel strategy. As will 
be seen in next section, this result does not hold under Cournot competition. 
Comparing channel structure DI with channel structure DD, we have 
 
Lemma 4. Under Bertrand competition, when the public firm decentralizes, the private firm's 
channel strategies are as follows. 
(i). With a wholesale-price contract, the private firm prefers decentralization to integration if 
0.903  , and prefers integration to decentralization otherwise. 
(ii). With a two-part tariff contract, the private firm prefers decentralization to integration. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The intuition of Lemma 4 is exactly the same as that of Lemma 1. That is, in the wholesale-
price contract case, the “retailer buffer” effect of decentralization outweighs the “double 
marginalization” effect only when products are highly substitutable, and thus the private firm 
prefers decentralization when products are highly substitutable and prefers integration otherwise. 
Under the two-part tariff contract scenario, the private firm always prefers decentralization 
because decentralization offers the “retailer buffer” effect without the “double marginalization” 
problem. 
We end this section by summarizing Lemma 1 to 4 into the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Under Bertrand competition, 
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(i). In the wholesale-price contract case, channel structure DI arises in equilibrium if 
 0,0.903  ; otherwise, channel structure DD is the equilibrium; 
(ii). In the two-part tariff contract case, channel structure DD always occurs in equilibrium. 
Proof. From Lemma 2 and 3, the public firm always chooses decentralization, and thus the 
equilibrium channel structure simply follows from Lemma 4. 
 
4. Channel strategies under Cournot competition 
In this section we proceed to analyze the four channel structures, II, ID, DI and DD, under 
Cournot competition. 
 
4.1. Channel structure II  
We first consider both firm 0 and firm 1 choose to integrate, so they determine their 
respective quantities to solve 
 
     
   
0
1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1
, , ,
, ,
II
q
II
F
q
Max SW q q p q q q p q q q CS
Max q q p q q q
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

 

.  (15) 
Using the inverse demand Eq. (2) and solving the FOCs from Eq. (15) yield  
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0 2
1 2
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q
q
 

 







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 
,  (16) 
from which we have optimal social welfare and the private firm’s profit, which are summarized 
in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
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Simple comparison gives  
0 1
0 1II IIq q     , which means that the public firm supplies 
more products than the private firm does due to the social welfare concern. 
 
4.2. Channel structure ID 
In this subsection we consider that firm 0 integrates while firm 1 decentralizes by distributing 
through retailer 1. By backward induction, we first analyze the last stage. Given firm 1's 
wholesale price 1w , firm 0 and retailer 1's objectives are 
 
     
   
0
1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
, , ,
, ,
ID
q
ID
R
q
Max SW q q p q q q p q q q CS
Max q q p q q w q
   


     
.  (17) 
Solving the FOCs from Eq. (17), we obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0 1 2
1
1 1 2
2
2
1
2
ID
ID
w
q w
w
q w
  

 



 



  
 
.  (18) 
Similar to subsection 3.2, firm 1 solves      
1
1 0 1 1 1 1,
W ID
F
w
Max q q w q w   under a wholesale-
price contract, and solves      
1
1 0 1 1 1 1,
T ID
F
w
Max q q p q w   under a two-part tariff contract. Thus, 
observing Eq. (18), firm 1 sets its optimal wholesale price at 
   1 1 2
W ID
w  

   under a 
wholesale-price contract, and 
   21 2 1
T ID
w   

    under a two-part tariff contract. 
Correspondingly, the social welfare and firm 1's profit can be obtained. We summarize all the 
results in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
Comparing channel structure II with under channel structure ID, we have 
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Lemma 5. Under Cournot competition, if the public firm integrates, 
(i). In the wholesale-price contract case, the private firm always prefers integration to 
decentralization. 
(ii). In the two-part tariff contract case, the private firm always prefers decentralization to 
integration. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The intuition of Lemma 5 is similar to Lemma 1. Recall that the “retailer buffer” effect of 
decentralization may outweigh the “double marginalization” effect only when the competition is 
intense. Because Cournot competition is not intense enough (less intense than Bertrand 
competition), the “retailer buffer” effect of decentralization actually never outweighs the “double 
marginalization” effect under Cournot competition. As a result, when both of the two effects 
exist (in the wholesale-price contract case), the private firm prefers integration. When only the 
“retailer buffer” effect exists (in the two-part tariff contract case), the private firm prefers 
decentralization. 
 
4.3. Channel structure DI 
Here we consider the channel structure where firm 0 distributes its product through retailer 0 
while firm 1 integrates. Knowing firm 0's wholesale price 0w , retailer 0 and firm 1 solve 
 
   
   
0
1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1
, ,
, ,
DI
R
q
DI
F
q
Max q q p q q w q
Max q q p q q q
     

 

,  (19) 
which gives equilibrium quantities 
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 
 
 
 
0
0 0 2
0
1 0 2
2 2
4
2
4
DI
DI
w
q w
w
q w
 

  



 



  
 
.  (20) 
Again, firm 0's welfare objective function remains unchanged under the two vertical contracts. 
Substituting Eq. (20) into firm 0's objective function and then solving it yield  
 
 
2
0 2
2
4 3
DIw
 

  

,  
from which the social welfare and firm 1's profit are derived and summarized  in Table 4 in the 
Appendix.  
Comparing channel structure II with channel structure DI, we have 
 
Lemma 6. Under Cournot competition, if the private firm integrates, the public firm always 
prefers decentralization to integration, regardless of the vertical contract form. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
At the first glance, Lemma 6 here seems just the counterpart of Lemma 2 under Bertrand 
competition, while the underlying intuitions and explanations are actually quite different. We 
will see the difference more clearly later together with Lemma 8, and because of this, we will 
leave the discussions of Lemma 6 later with Lemma 8.  
 
4.4. Channel structure DD 
Now we move on to consider fully decentralized channel structure DD, where firm 0 and 
firm 1 distribute their products exclusively through independent private retailers, retailer 0 and 
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retailer 1, respectively. Knowing upstream wholesale prices 0w  and 1w , retailer 0 and retailer 1 
solve 
 
      
      
0
1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
, , , ,
, , , ,
DD
R
q
DD
R
q
Max p q q p q q p q q w q
Max p q q p q q p q q w q
     

     
.  (21) 
Solving the FOCs from Eq. (21), we obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1
0 0 1 2
1 0
1 0 1 2
2 2
,
4
2 2
,
4
DD
DD
w w
q w w
w w
q w w
  

  



  



   
 
.  (22) 
Similar to Eqs. (13) and (14) in subsection 3.4, here firm 0 and firm 1's objectives are 
 
     
 
0
1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1
, ,
W DD
w
W DD
F
w
Max SW p q q q p q q q CS
Max w q
   


 

  (23) 
under the wholesale-price contract scenario, and  
 
     
 
0
1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1
, ,
T DD
w
T DD
F
w
Max SW p q q q p q q q CS
Max p q
   


 

  (24) 
under the two-part tariff contract scenario. 
Substituting Eq. (22) into Eqs. (23) and (24), we can solve the equilibrium wholesale prices 
under the two contract scenarios, and then obtain the respective equilibrium  social welfare and 
firm 1's profit under the two contract scenarios, which are all summarized in Table 4 in the 
Appendix. 
Comparing channel structure DI with channel structure DD, we have 
 
Lemma 7. Under Cournot competition, if the public firm decentralizes, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
27 
(i). In the wholesale-price contract case, the private firm always prefers integration to 
decentralization. 
(ii). In the two-part tariff contract case, the private firm always prefers decentralization to 
integration. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
The interpretation of Lemma 7 is obviously the same as that of Lemma 5. Combining Lemma 
5 and 7, we can see that, under Cournot competition, the private firm always prefers integration 
under a wholesale-price contract, and always prefers decentralization under a two-part tariff 
contract, regardless of the public firm’s strategy. 
Comparing channel structure ID with channel structure DD, we have 
 
Lemma 8. Under Cournot competition, if the private firm decentralizes, the public firm prefers 
integration to decentralization, regardless of the vertical contract form. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Combining Lemma 6 and 8 here under Cournot competition, and comparing them with 
Lemma 2 and 3 under Bertrand competition, we can see a key difference: under Bertrand 
competition, the public firm always prefers decentralization; while under Cournot competition, 
the public firm’s preference depends on the private firm’s choice. This difference arises from 
how the “first-mover advantage” of decentralization will affect the “price or quantity setting 
power” of the public firm under the two different competition modes. 
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Under Bertrand competition, as mentioned before, from Eqs. (10) and (12) we can see that the 
“first-mover advantage” of decentralization does not contradict the “price-setting power” of the 
public firm: reducing 0w  will reduce 0p  (price-setting power that lowers the retail price of its 
own channel for welfare enhancement) and will also reduce 1p  (first-mover advantage that 
lowers its competitor’s retail price for welfare enhancement). This means if the public firm 
chooses decentralization, it will enjoy the “first-mover advantage” without losing its “price-
setting power”, and thus the public firm will always choose decentralization under Bertrand 
competition. 
However, under Cournot competition, from Eqs. (20) and (22) we can see that the “first-
mover advantage” of decentralization conflicts with the “quantity-setting power” of the public 
firm: for “quantity-setting power” of its own channel, 0w  needs to be reduced to increase 0q  for 
welfare improvement; while for “first-mover advantage” to affect its competitor, 0w  needs to be 
increased to increase 1q  for welfare improvement. This conflict means that, if the public firm 
chooses decentralization, it will enjoy “first-mover advantage” at the expense of its “quantity-
setting power”. Note that the “quantity-setting power” is very important under Cournot 
competition because the competition is not intense and Retailer 0 tends to set 0q  very small for 
its own profit purpose. This can be seen by simply comparing 0
IIq   given by Eq. (16) with 0
DIq   
given by Eq. (20): without subsidy ( 0 0w  ), 0
DIq   will be less than half of 0
IIq   due to Retailer 
0’s self-optimization. Therefore, only when the “first-mover advantage” is significant enough 
will the public firm choose decentralization. It is intuitive that, when the private firm chooses 
integration, the “first-mover advantage” of the public firm under decentralization will be big 
because the public firm will be the only first-mover; when the private firm chooses 
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decentralization, the “first-mover advantage” of the public firm under decentralization will not 
be that big because the public firm is not the only first-mover. As a result, the public firm will 
choose decentralization in the former case (Lemma 6), and will choose integration in the latter 
case (Lemma 8). 
We now summarize Lemma 5 to 8 into the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. Under Cournot competition, 
(i). Under a wholesale-price contract, channel structure DI arises in equilibrium; 
(ii). Under a two-part tariff contract, channel structure ID arises in equilibrium. 
Proof. Lemma 5 and 7 state that the private firm always prefers integration under a whole-price 
contract, and always prefers decentralization under a two-part tariff contract. Then the 
equilibrium channel structures simply follow from Lemma 6 and 8. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines distribution channel strategies in a mixed market under different contract 
and competition scenarios. Our results suggest that the equilibrium channel structures depend on 
the market competition mode, the vertical contract form, and the level of product substitutability. 
Specifically, the channel strategy of the private firm depends mainly on the vertical contract form: 
in the two-part tariff contract case, the private firm always chooses decentralization; in the 
wholesale-price contract case, the private firm chooses integration for most scenarios except for 
highly substitutable products under Bertrand competition (i.e., under very intense competition). 
The channel strategy of the public firm depends mainly on the competition mode: under Bertrand 
competition, the public firm always chooses decentralization; under Cournot competition, the 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
30 
public firm always chooses the opposite of the private firm’s strategy. Note that, due to scope 
limitation and to keep the paper concise, we focus on endogenous channel strategies and assume 
that other settings (i.e., vertical contracts, competition modes) are exogenously given. We believe 
it is worthwhile to examine other non-linear contracts such as revenue sharing and return policy, 
which are left for future research. 
This research sheds some light on policy considerations regarding privatization. In particular, 
there are some differences in channel strategies between private duopoly and mixed duopoly. For 
instance, channel structure II (both firms adopting an integrated channel strategy) is always one 
equilibrium in a private duopoly, while it is never an equilibrium in our mixed duopoly setting, 
i.e., at least one firm will choose to decentralize in a mixed duopoly. Therefore, privatization of a 
public firm may lead to changes of channel structures. This indicates that a policy maker should 
carefully design its policy to induce the market players to arrive at a desired equilibrium. 
 
Appendix.  
Table 3. Equilibrium solutions under Bertrand competition 
 
 
Channel Structure 
II ID DI DD 
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sale 
price 
N/A 
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 
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T
w
w


 

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Retail 
price 
 
 
0
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
p
p
  

 







 
 
  
 
  
 
 
0
1
0
1
2
2
2
2
3 2
2 1 2
3 2
2 1 2
2 1
2 1
W
W
T
T
p
p
p
p
  
 
 
 




 
 
 



 

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
 
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  
0
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p
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   
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1
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W
W
T
T
p
p
p
p
   
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   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 

  

 


 

 
  
 
Sales 
quantity   
0
1 2
1
1 2
q
q



 



 
 
  
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0
1
0
1
2
1
2 1 2
1
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W
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q
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q
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 
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
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
 
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q
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   
 
 



 
 
  
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 
  
2
2
2
1
1 2
 
 

 
    
 
2
1 2 2
2
1 2
4 1 2
4 1
W
F
T
F

 


 
 
 

   
  
2
2 2
2
2
1 2
1 4 3
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
3
2 2 2
1 2
4 2
3
2 2
1 2
4 2
1 4 2
1 5 20 16
2 1 2
1 8 8
W
F
T
F
   
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
Social 
welfare 
  
2
2
22 1 2
A
  
 
   
 
 
2
22 2
2
2
8 1 2
7 8
8 1
W
T
B
SW
SW

 
 


 



 
 
  
2 3 2
2
7 5
2 1 4 3
   
 
  
 
   
  
2
2
4 2
2
2
4 2
1 5 20 16
1 8 8
W
T
G
SW
H
SW

  

  

  

  
 
where  
 
4 3 22 7 7A         , 
 
5 4 3 28 4 32 20 32 23B           , 
 4 3 22 8 4 8C         , 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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 4 3 22 8 8D       , 
 5 4 3 22 5 8 20 6 16E           , 
  
2
4 3 22 8 2 8F         , 
 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 26 19 50 150 146 414 174 466 72 184G                   , 
 8 6 5 4 3 216 6 74 14 114 8 56H               . 
 
Table 4. Equilibrium solutions under Cournot competition 
 
Channel Structure 
II ID DI DD 
Whole-
sale 
price 
N/A 
 
 
1
2
1
1
2
2 1
W
T
w
w
 
 






  
2
0 2
2
4 3
w
 


 

 
  
  
  
  
 
 
3
0 2 2
2
1 2 2
4 3
0 4 2
1 4 2
2 4 8
2 4 2 4
2 1 4
2 4 2 4
2 8 8
8 8
2 1
8 8
W
W
T
T
w
w
w
w
   
   
  
   
   
 
  
 
    
 
   

 

   
   
 
  


  
 
Retail 
price 
 
0
1 2
0
1
2
p
p
 





 
  
 
 
0
1
0
1
2
2
0
1 3
2 2
0
1
2
W
W
T
T
p
p
p
p
  

 
 

 


 

 


 
 
 
0
1
2
2
1
4 3
2 1
4 3
p
p
  

 





 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
0
1
0
1
2
2 2
2
2 2
2
4 2
2
4 2
1 6
2 4 2 4
2 1 6
2 4 2 4
1 2
8 8
2 1 2
8 8
W
W
T
T
p
p
p
p
  
   
  
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
   

 

   
  
 
 

 

 
 
Sales 
quantity 
 
 
 
0
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
q
q
 

 







 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
0
1
2
2
2
4
2 2
1
2 2
2
2 1
2 1
W
W
T
T
q
q
q
q
  

 

 



  
 



 




 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
2
4 3
4 3
2 1
4 3
q
q
 

 





 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
0
1
0
1
3 2
2 2
2 2
3 2
4 2
4 2
2 10 16
2 4 2 4
4 1
2 4 2 4
2 6 8
8 8
4 1
8 8
W
W
T
T
q
q
q
q
   
   
 
   
   
 
 
 
   
 
   


    
   
 
  


  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
33 
Retailer 
profit 
N/A 
 
 
2 2
1 2
2
1
1
4 2
0
W
R
T
R
 


 

 
  
 
2 2
2
2
4 3
4 3
 



 
 
   
 
   
 
 
2
3 2 2
0 2 2
2 2
2 2
1 2 2
2 2
2
3 2 2
0 2
4 2
1
2 10 16
2 4 2 4
16 1
2 4 2 4
2 6 8
8 8
0
W
R
W
R
T
R
T
R
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
    

 
 
   
   
 
  

 
 
Private 
firm 
profit 
 
 
2 2
2
2
1
2
 



 
 
 
 
 
2 2
1 2
2
1
1
4 2
1
4 1
W
F
T
F
 

 


 


 

  
 
2 2
2
2
4 1
4 3
 



 
   
   
   
 
2 2 2
1 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
1 2
4 2
8 1 4
2 4 2 4
8 1 2
8 8
W
F
T
F
  
   
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Social 
welfare 
 
 
3 2 2
2
2
2 2 6 7
2 2
   

  

 
 
 
 
2
2
2
2
8 2
7
8 1
W
T
I
SW
SW


 






  
 
2
2
7 6
2 4 3
 



    
 
2
2 2
2 2
2
2
4 2
2 2 4 2 4
2 8 8
W
T
J
SW
K
SW

   

 

   

 
 
where  
 4 3 26 12 14 23I         , 
 7 6 5 4 3 22 5 40 80 232 388 224 368J               ,  
 7 6 5 4 3 22 5 24 40 104 132 96 112K               . 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Under Bertrand competition, comparing channel structure II with channel structure ID in Table 3, 
we have 
i). Under the wholesale-price contract scenario: 
 
   
   
2 2
1 1 22 2
2 3 0, 0.816
0,otherwise4 1 2
W IDII
F F
if  
 
  
   
 
 ; 
ii). Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
 
 
   
4 2
1 1 22 2
0
4 1 2
T IDII
F F
 
 
    
 
 . 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
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 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
34 
Since the public firm always maximizes social welfare, here the vertical contract choice makes 
no difference. Under Bertrand competition, comparing channel structure II with channel 
structure DI in Table 3, we have 
 
   
  
22 2 2
2
2 2
1 1
0
2 4 3 2
II DISW SW
   
 
 
   
 
. 
Proof of Lemma 3. 
Under Bertrand competition, comparing channel structure ID with channel structure DD in Table 
3, we have 
Under the wholesale-price contract scenario: 
     
     
2 2 4 6 8 10 12 2
2 22 2 2 4
1344 4944 7400 5759 2452 540 48
0
8 1 2 16 20 5
W ID W DD
SW SW
       
   
     
   
   
 
Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
 
     
   
2 2 4 6 2
22 2 4
48 80 32
0
8 1 8 8
T ID T DD
SW SW
    
  
  
   
  
. 
Proof of Lemma 4. 
Under Bertrand competition, comparing channel structure DI with channel structure DD in Table 
3, we have 
Under the wholesale-price contract scenario: 
      
    
2
2 2 4 6 8 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 4
2 1 2 64 176 164 61 8 0, 0.903
0,otherwise1 4 3 16 20 5
W DDDI
F F
if       
   
       
   
   
 ; 
Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
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     
    
2
4 2 4 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 4
1 4 2 2
0
1 4 3 8 8
T DDDI
F F
     
   
   
    
   
. 
Proof of Lemma 5. 
Under Cournot competition, comparing channel structure II with channel structure ID in Table 4, 
we have 
Under the wholesale-price contract scenario: 
 
     
 
2 2 2
1 1 2
2
1 2
0
4 2
W IDII
F F
  

 
   

; 
Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
 
   
  
4 2
1 1 2
2
1
0
4 1 2
T IDII
F F
  
 

    
 
. 
Proof of Lemma 6. 
Since the public firm maximizes social welfare, the forms of vertical contracts make no 
difference to Lemma 6. Comparing channel structure DI with channel structure DD in Table 4, 
we have 
 
 
  
22 2
2
2 2
1
0
2 4 3 2
DI IISW SW
  
 

  
 
. 
Proof of Lemma 7. 
Under Cournot competition, comparing channel structure DI with channel structure DD in Table 
4, we have 
Under the wholesale-price contract scenario: 
 
      
     
2 2 2 4 6 2
1 1 2 2 2
2 2 2
4 1 2 64 48 4
0
4 3 4 2 4 2
W DDDI
F F
     
    
    
   
    
; 
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 8 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
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39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
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Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
 
     
   
24 2 4 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 4
4 1 4 2
0
4 3 8 8
T DDDI
F F
    
  
  
    
  
. 
Proof of Lemma 8. 
Under Cournot competition, comparing channel structure ID with channel structure DD in Table 
4, we have  
Under the wholesale-price contract scenario:  
 
       
     
22 2 4 6 8 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 192 240 104 17
0
8 2 4 2 4 2
W ID W DD
SW SW
      
    
    
  
    
; 
Under the two-part tariff contract scenario: 
 
       
  
2 2 3 2 3 2
2
2 4
1 4 2 4 2
0
8 1 8 8
T ID T DD
SW SW
      
  
    
  
  
. 
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